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Abstract
Output growth, investment and the real interest rate are all found em-
pirically to be negatively a¤ected by ination. But a seeming puzzle arises
of opposite Tobin-like ination e¤ects because theory indicates a negative
Tobin e¤ect when investment falls and a positive Tobin e¤ect when the
real interest rate rises. We dene inations Tobin e¤ect more specically
in terms of the e¤ect on the capital to e¤ective labor ratio and resolve
the puzzle by showing the simultaneous occurrence of all three negative
ination e¤ects, on growth, investment and real interest rates, in a model
calibrated to postwar US data. Here, investment along with consumption
are exchanged for within a monetary endogenous growth economy with hu-
man capital and a decentralized credit-producing sector.
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1. Introduction
A host of recent evidence indicates that ination causes a negative long run e¤ect
on economic growth, both using international panel data (Gillman, Harris, and
Matyas 2004) and international G7 time series (Fountas, Karanasos, and Kim
2006)1. Yet, starting as far back as Feldstein (1982) and including Barro (1995),
ination is also found empirically to cause a decrease in investment; recent long
run evidence supports this (Madsen 2003, Byrne and Davis 2004).2 A theoretically
negative long run investment e¤ect is found as well (Stockman 1981, Smith and
Egteren 2005, Mansoorian andMohsin 2006) and this result is viewed by Stockman
(1981) as an "inverse", or negative, Tobin (1965) e¤ect. The conundrum comes
about in that there is also signicant long run evidence that ination causes
a lower real interest rate (Rapach 2003, Rapach and Wohar 2005, Ahmed and
Rogers 2000), which is viewed as a positive Tobin e¤ect. This appears to be a
puzzling contradiction: evidence indicating both long run negative and long run
positive Tobin e¤ects. Resolving this puzzle theoretically, in a way consistent
with the empirical long run ination e¤ects on growth, real interest rates and
investment, has not been done within standard general equilibrium analysis.
In Tobin (1965), the Solow (1956) model is extended by adding on a money
demand function in which money and physical capital are substitutes. Then in
the long run, an increase in ination induces substitution away from real money
towards capital. The consequent long run equilibrium increase in the capital to
labor ratio, or "capital intensity" is the focus in Tobin, and so can be thought of as
a positive Tobin e¤ect. It results in a lower marginal product of capital and lower
1Fountas et al. (2006) nd "strong evidence" that ination negatively Granger-causes output
growth in the G7 countries for monthly postwar data using a bivariate VAR-GARCH model.
They also discuss more ambigous results on how ination uncertainty a¤ects growth, which is
theoretically explored for example in Lioui and Poncet (2008).
2Some of this evidence is related to ination uncertainty, as in Byrne and Davis (2004),
although uncertainty is not introduced in our paper. Also, Ahmed and Rogers (2000) is an
exception that shows evidence that the investment to output ratio rises in the US when ination
goes up.
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real interest rate. There is a temporary increase in output along the transition
path until the new steady state is reached, within the exogenous growth Solow
world (see also Ireland (1994) and the Walsh (1998) treatment). Thus the long
run real interest rate falls, the long run investment rate rises and output growth
only temporarily rises.3
Fairly robust evidence supports only the rst element of the original Tobin
(1965) theory: that the long real interest rate falls. And in contrast to Tobin,
evidence supports that the investment rate falls and that the long run growth
rate of output falls. Thus the answer to this dilemma of seemingly opposite
Tobin e¤ects, along with a negative long run growth e¤ect, cannot be found in
Tobins extension of Solow. Instead for the puzzles resolution we show that it
is su¢ cient to view the ination mechanism more broadly. And it is necessary
to carefully dene what is meant by the Tobin e¤ect in this broader framework:
it is dened as in Tobin as "capital intensity", but in particular in terms of the
e¤ect of ination in causing higher capital to e¤ective labour ratios across sectors
(as in Gillman and Nakov (2003)). Our denition is almost identical to what
underlies the Tobin e¤ect in his original model, except that our capital intensity
is the stationary capital to e¤ective labour ratio, which includes the Lucas (1988)
indexing of labour by endogenous human capital instead of the Solow indexing of
labour by exogenous technological change.
Our approach is therefore the ination tax e¤ect along the balanced-growth
path equilibrium with Lucas (1988) endogenous growth (Section 2). Previously it
has been shown in this setting how ination acts as a tax on goods and productive
time, causing the real interest rate and the output growth rate to fall (Gillman and
Kejak 2005b), qualitatively as appears to be consistent with evidence. But the
problem is that the investment to output ratio rises in such models (Gomme 1993),
3In the Solow-Tobin model, using standard notation, output y depends on capital k and
labor n: yt = Atk
1 
t n

t ; investment i with depreciation k is it = kt+1   kt (1  k) ; and
the balanced path output growth rate g = (kt+1   kt) =kt is exogenous. It can be seen that
it=yt = (g + k) 

kt
A
1=
t nt

; if ktnt rises because of ination, then so does it=yt:
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rather than falling as in recent empirical evidence and as in the theory of Stockman
(1981). Stockmans approach is to require money for the exchange of not just
goods consumption, but also for all output including investment. This reasonable
assumption, in that all output does in fact have to be exchanged for, means
extending the cash-in-advance constraint beyond its typical specication for only
consumption to additionally include investment.4 But a simple approach of just
using the actual Stockman model is not su¢ cient: there ination causes the real
interest to rise as the capital stock is decreased, which is contrary to the evidence
showing that the real interest rate decreases.
The key to resolving this puzzle is to consider that the real interest rate ef-
fect need not be positive as in Stockman (1981), when the Stockman exchange
constraint is included in a more general model. An increase in the ination rate
can still decrease the real interest rate (unlike Stockman), while at the same time
the investment rate decreases (as in Stockman). Consider that there can be two
opposing e¤ects on the real interest rate, when it is determined exclusively by
the capital to e¤ective labour in the goods sector in an economy such as Gomme
(1993). If the Stockman constraint covers all of the consumers expenditures, then
an increase in the ination tax discourages the consumers supply of physical cap-
ital (or savings), causes the savings schedule to "shift backwards" and pressures
the real interest rate upwards as the equilibrium investment decreases. But with
the increase in the ination tax also falling on consumption, the consumer substi-
tutes away from (exchanged for) goods, towards (non-exchange) leisure and away
from labour, which pressures the real wage to rise relative to the real interest rate;
meanwhile this substitution also is from current to future consumption, towards
more savings and pressuring the real interest rate downwards. As long as the
labour decrease is large enough relative to the decrease of the physical capital
available, then the real wage to real interest rate ratio will rise, the capital to
4Note that the original Lucas (1980) cash-in-advance constraint on only consumption was
applied to an economy in which there was no physical capital; investment is zero and not
explicitly excluded from the exchange constraint.
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e¤ective labour ratios in the all sectors will rise and the real interest rate will fall
(Section 3). This means that the investment to output ratio can continue to fall
even while the capital to e¤ective labour ratios rise across sectors and the real
interest rate falls. This scenario, if it occurs, solves the puzzle.
This paper shows that applying the cash-in-advance constraint to both con-
sumption and investment within the endogenous growth framework indeed does
t the described ination evidence, within a realistically calibrated model of the
US economy, for ination rates rising up towards moderately high levels (Section
4). Besides the Stockman (1981) constraint, the growth part of the model is also
a key ingredient. Ination reduces the return to human capital and the economic
growth rate. It does this because the ination-induced goods to leisure substi-
tution causes a lower "capacity utilization rate" of human capital when leisure
increases; this directly lowers the return on human capital and the growth rate.
But since the after-ination-tax return on physical capital must equal the now-
lowered return on human capital along the balanced growth equilibrium path,
the savings-investment rate falls throughout the whole ination range under con-
sideration. This means that the ination-induced fall in the investment rate is
robust within a full range of the ination rate, while the fall in the real interest
rate becomes less and reverses to become an increase in the real interest rate once
ination continues to rise past a moderately high level. At this point the positive
pressure on the real interest rate from the savings decline dominates the negative
pressure from the labour decrease, which in turn has become increasingly smaller
in magnitude because of the critical role played by exchange credit: it is used
increasing more to avoid the ination tax, allowing leisure to be used increasingly
less as an avoidance device.
The results rest upon the human capital endogenous growth feature, which is
a widely used paradigm,5 and upon leisure use, which is ubiquitous in dynamic
5In contrast, a positive Tobin (1965) e¤ect will not result in an Ak endogenous growth model,
even with the Stockman (1981) exchange constraint, in that the real interest rate is exogenously
equal to A: This result and an overview of growth models is provided in Gillman and Kejak
(2005a).
4
macroeconomic models and strongly emphasized for example by Chari, Kehoe,
and McGrattan (2008) as a key channel. The papers economy is the same as
the nesting model of Gillman and Kejak (2005a), except that here it is extended
by decentralizing the banking sector that produces exchange credit. This explicit
banking production approach, which is known as the nancial intermediation ap-
proach in the banking literature (Matthews and Thompson 2008), is based on a
well-established industry-production function for nancial intermediation services.
The credit production function still yields the same empirically plausible gener-
alized Cagan (1956) money demand (Mark and Sul 2003, Gillman and Otto 2007),
as is found in Gillman and Kejak (2005b), which is essential for a realistic simula-
tion of the negative ination e¤ect on growth. And the money to credit substitu-
tion implicit in the money demand determines how much leisure increases when
ination goes up, determining in part the e¤ect of ination on the real interest
rate and therefore the plausibility of the models Tobin (1965) e¤ect on interest
rates. Decentralizing the banking sector is important in that it makes more exact-
ing the calibration of the money demand, in that this now depends explicitly on
parameters of a micro-founded credit production technology. Comparative stat-
ics of these technology parameters show how they a¤ect money velocity and the
balanced-growth rate, which in turn a¤ects the investment rate and real interest
rate. These results are also shown through full model simulations (Section 4).
Therefore the paper contributes a theoretical explanation of seemingly conict-
ing Tobin (1965) evidence on investment and real interest rates, within an economy
that is calibrated realistically to US postwar data. At the same time, this model is
theoretically consistent with other long run ination-related evidence: on money
demand, the output growth rate and on the employment rate; as well as with the
e¤ect of nancial sector productivity increases on output growth and with the as-
sumed structure of nancial intermediation services production (Section 5). The
consistency of the economy with these other empirical e¤ects helps create greater
condence in the models robustness for its resolution of the Tobin evidence.
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2. Representative Agent Model
2.1. Consumer Problem
The representative agents discounted utility stream depends on the consumption
of goods ct and leisure xt in a constant elasticity fashion:
1X
t=0

1
1 + 
t
(log ct +  log xt) : (2.1)
Exchange is required for both consumption and investment goods, denoted by
it; whereby the consumer uses either nominal money, Mt; or credit from a credit
card. Let qt denote the real quantity of credit and Pt denote the nominal goods
price. This makes the exchange constraint:
Mt + Ptqt  Ptct + Ptit: (2.2)
It is assumed that all expenditures are sourced from deposits, denoted in real
units by dt; held at the nancial intermediary. The consumer buy shares in the
intermediary by making a deposit, whereby the price per share is given by the
intermediary at a xed price of one, so there is no possibility of a capital gain.
However the share, or unit deposit, yields a dividend that is paid by the inter-
mediary to the consumer, so that the intermediary has no remaining prots after
the dividend distribution; the intermediary is a "mutual bank" owned by the con-
sumer, as is consistent with a representative agent model. The per unit dividend
is in essence the payment of a nominal interest rate on deposited funds. Denote
the per unit nominal dividend as Rqt; total nominal dividends are then PtRqtdt
(see Section 2.2 for the intermediary problem).
Since all expenditures come out of the deposits, this means that
Ptdt = Pt (ct + it) : (2.3)
The fractions of capital allocated across the three sectors, of goods (G), human
capital (H) and credit (Q), add up to 1:
1 = sGt + sHt + sQt; (2.4)
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the fractions of labour add up to the total productively utilized time, or 1  xt :
1  xt = lGt + lHt + lQt: (2.5)
Physical capital, kt; changes according to
kt+1 = it + (1  K) kt: (2.6)
Human capital, ht; is accumulated through a constant returns to scale (CRS)
production function using e¤ective labour and capital; with AH > 0;  2 [0; 1];
ht+1 = AH (lHtht)
 (sHtkt)
1  + (1  H)ht: (2.7)
The change in the nominal money stock, Mt+1  Mt; is equal to income mi-
nus expenditure. The nominal income received from capital and labour, with Pt
denoting the price of goods and with rt and wt denoting the real rental and wage
rates, is Ptrt(sGt+sQt)kt+Ptwt(lGt+ lQt)ht: Also there is a lump sum government
transfer Vt and the dividend distribution from the intermediary of Rqtdt. Expen-
ditures are on consumption and investment, Pt (ct + it) ; and for the payment of
the fee for credit services; with Pqt denoting the nominal price per unit of credit,
this fee is Pqtqt: Together these items make the income constraint:
Mt+1 = Mt + Ptrt (sGt + sQt) kt + Ptwt (lGt + lQt)ht + Vt + PtRqtdt (2.8)
 Ptct   Ptit   Pqtqt:
2.2. Financial Intermediary Problem
There are two approaches to positing the production function for nancial inter-
mediary services: the "production" approach and the "nancial intermediation"
approach. In the rst, only labour and capital is used to produce the nancial ser-
vice, typically in CRS fashion. In the second, a third input is added, the deposits
into the bank and again a constant returns to scale function is used, but now
of the three inputs instead of just labour and capital. The distinction between
the two approaches, when nested as part of a general equilibrium, is crucial. As
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King and Plosser (1984) insightfully point out, if the CRS assumption is made
using just labour and capital as inputs, then there is a at marginal cost curve of
credit supply, where the intratemporal credit is used for exchange. And with an
alternative of money for making exchanges, with a marginal shadow cost that is
also "at" at the nominal interest rate of R; then there is no unique equilibrium
between money and credit use.
In this section it is demonstrated that the nancial intermediation approach, of
including deposits as an input, solves this problem of the denition of equilibrium,
by giving an upward sloping marginal cost, per unit of deposits. Then a unique
equilibrium between money and credit results. This is impossible following the
production approach without deposits as is proved below in the following section
on the full equilibrium analysis (Section 3.1).6 And the nancial intermediation
approach is supported empirically (see Section 5).
The intermediary is assumed to operate competitively. It sets the price of
deposits and then the consumer determines the quantity of deposits it wants to
hold, dt; as with a mutual bank. The production function for credit services is
CRS in e¤ective labour, since the human capital indexes the raw labor in all
production sectors of the endogenous growth model, capital and the deposited
funds dt:With AQ 2 (0;1); 1 2 [0; 1); 2 2 [0; 1) and assuming that 1+2 < 1;
the production function is given by7
qt = AQ (lQtht)
1 (sQtkt)
2 d
1 1 2
t : (2.9)
6Assuming only labor and capital (the "production" approach) King and Plosser (1984) note
that "The constant returns to scale structure implies that at given factor prices the nance
industry supply curve is horizontal." Baltensperger (1980), in focusing on costly intermediation
services, nds that the production function must be of decreasing returns to scale in capital and
labor, or conversely that there needs to be a convex cost function, so that the constant marginal
revenue per unit of funds equals the rising marginal cost per unit funds. Berk and Green (2004),
in their study of mutual funds intermediation, specify a convex cost function, as does Wang,
Basu, and Fernald (2004) for a variety of value-added bank services. Using the "production"
approach, Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein (1998) also assumes a money demand function, while
Li (2000) sets capital equal to one, both being ways to still get a unique equilibrium but requiring
additional assumptions.
7From Sealey and Lindley (1977) and Clark (1984), where this form of the function is rst
specied.
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Dividing equation (2.9) by dt and dening normalized variables as lqt  lQthtdt ;
sqt  sQtktdt and qt 
qt
dt
; the production function can be written as
qt = AQlqt
1sqt
2 : (2.10)
The solvency restriction that assets equal liabilities is given by
Ptqt +Mt = Ptdt: (2.11)
The liquidity constraint is that money withdrawn by the consumer is covered
by deposits:
Ptdt Mt: (2.12)
When no credit is used, the liquidity constraint holds with equality and is equal
to the solvency constraint.
Dening the residual return per unit of deposit as Rqt, which results after
prot maximization, the total nominal prot is then RqtdtPt and it is returned
to the consumer as owner of the bank, and its deposits. The competitive prot
maximization problem then can be written as maximizing prot, denoted by Qt;
with respect to the three inputs of capital, labour and deposits, subject to the
production function in equation (2.9); prot here is the revenue Pqtqt minus the
costs wtlQthtPt + rtsQtktPt; and the dividend payout RqtdtPt :
Max
lQt;sQt;dt
Qt = Pqtqt   wtlQthtPt   rtsQtktPt  RqtdtPt; (2.13)
subject to equation (2.9). More simply with normalized variables of Pqt
Pt
 pqt and
Qt  QtdtPt and using equation (2.10), the rms problem is
Max
lqt;sqt
Qt = pqtAQlqt
1sqt
2   wtlqt   rtsqt  Rqt: (2.14)
The solvency and liquidity constraints in equations (2.11) and (2.12) are always
satised in this simple problem. Zero prot, or Qt = 0; results through the
distribution of the dividends according to the number of shares of bank ownership
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as given by the real quantity of deposits dt; at the dividend rate of Rqt: Therefore
Rqt = pqtq

t (1  1   2) ; as follows directly from the CRS properties of credit
production. This residual dividend rate in equilibrium is equal to the per unit-
of-credit revenue of Rt minus the per unit cost (1 + 2)Rt; as shown below (in
Proposition 4, Section 3.1), by using in addition the equilibrium price of credit
(equation 2.22 below in Section 2.5).
The rst order conditions of the simplied problem in equation (2.14) can be
written as in terms of average and marginal products: with APlqt  q

t
lqt
, APsqt 
qt
sqt
; MPlqt  1APlqt ; MPsqt  2APsqt and the marginal cost per unit of credit,
denoted by MCt :
pqt =
wt
1

qt
lqt
  wt
1APlqt
=
wt
MPlqt
=MCt; (2.15)
pqt =
rt
2

qt
sqt
  rt
2APsqt
=
rt
MPsqt
=MCt: (2.16)
These Baumol (1952) conditions equate the marginal cost of credit funds to
the value of the marginal products of e¤ective labour and capital in producing the
credit, the standard price theoretic conditions for factor markets; the marginal
products are fractions, 1 and 2; of the average products. And from these con-
ditions, the marginal cost schedule can be derived traditionally in terms of input
prices, parameters and the output level qt :
From equation (2.15), MCt = wt1
lqt
qt
: Substituting in for lqt = A
  1
1
Q s
 2
1
qt (q

t )
1
1
from the production function in equation (2.10), gives thatMCt = wt1A
  1
1
Q s
 2
1
qt (q

t )
1 1
1 :
Finally, substituting in for sqt from the banks rst-order condition in equation
(2.16), in which sqt =
2MCt
rt
qt ; and simplifying gives that
MCt =

wt
1
 1
1+2

rt
2
 2
1+2
A
 1
1+2
Q (q

t )
1 1 2
1+2 : (2.17)
For simplication, dene   1 + 2 and rewrite the marginal cost as MCt =
Bt (q

t )
1 
 ; where Bt 

wt
1
 1


rt
2
 2

A
 1

Q :
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Consider the following proposition; the proof for this and all other propositions
(2-7) are given in the Appendix.
Proposition 1: The marginal cost curve is upward sloping for  2 (0; 1);
convex for  2 (0; 0:5) and concave for  2 (0:5; 1) when plotted against output
qt :
Figure 1 illustrates the convex case of the marginal cost curve (curved line),
with  = 0:3; B = 1:3541 and with the nominal interest rate of R = 0:15 also
drawn in as a horizontal line.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.0
0.5
1.0
q*
MC, R
Figure 1. Marginal Cost of Credit per unit of qt
2.3. Goods Producer Problem
The goods producer competitively hires labour and capital for use in its Cobb-
Douglas production function. Given AG 2 (0;1);  2 [0; 1],
yt = AG(lGtht)
(sGtkt)
1 ; (2.18)
with the rst-order conditions of
wt = AG(lGtht)
 1(sGtkt)1 ; (2.19)
rt = (1  )AG(lGtht)(sGtkt) : (2.20)
2.4. Government Financing Problem
The government money supply changes according to a lump sum transfer of cash,
Vt; given to the consumer each period:
Mt+1 =Mt + Vt: (2.21)
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Assuming that this supply is such that there is a constant rate of money supply
growth, dened by   Vt
Mt
; this money supply is
Mt+1 =Mt (1 + ) :
2.5. Balanced Growth Path Equilibrium
Given prices rt; wt; Pt; Pqt and Rqt; the consumer maximizes utility in equation
(2.1) subject to the constraints in equations (2.2) to (2.8), with respect to ct; xt;
lGt; lHt; lQt; sGt; sHt; sQt; qt; dt; it; kt+1; ht+1 andMt+1. Given prices rt; wt; Pt, Pqt
and the technology of equation (2.10), the nancial intermediary maximizes prot
(equation 2.14) with respect to normalized inputs, yielding equilibrium equations
(2.15) and (2.16). The goods producer maximizes prot subject to the CRS
production function constraint (2.18), giving conditions (2.19) and (2.20). And
the governments budget constraint (2.21) provides the market clearing condition
for the money market; the deposit condition (2.3) provides market clearing for
the intermediarys deposit market; and goods market clearing of income equal to
expenditure is given by equation (2.8).
Along the balanced growth path (BGP) all growing real variables (ct; yt; qt; dt;
mt Mt=Pt; it; kt+1; ht+1) grow at the same rate, with this balanced growth rate
denoted by g: Other stationary variables on the BGP also are denoted without
the time index in the following BGP equilibrium conditions (with   1 + 2);
these are then used to describe the e¤ect of ination in the next section.
pq = R; (2.22)
R =  + + ; (2.23)
m
y
= 1 

R

1 A
1
1 
Q
1
w
 1
1 
2
r
 2
1 

; (2.24)
x
ct
=
1 + ~R
wht
; (2.25)
~R = (1  q)R + Rq; (2.26)
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wr
=

1  
sGkt
lGht
=
"
1  "
sHkt
lHht
=
1
2
sQkt
lQht
; (2.27)
rH = "AH

sHkt
lHht
1 "
(1  x); (2.28)
1 + g =
1 + rH   H
1 + 
=
1 + r
1+ ~R
  K
1 + 
; (2.29)
it
kt
=
kt+1   kt (1  K)
kt
= g + K ; (2.30)
it
kt
yt
kt
=
g + K
AG(
lGht
sGkt
)  sG
=
g + K
r  sG =
r
1+ ~R
   (1  K)
r  sG (1 + ) : (2.31)
3. Analysis of the E¤ect of Ination
The price of credit per unit is simply the nominal interest rate, by equation (2.22),
giving the perfectly elastic demand for credit at the price R; thus the marginal
cost of money (R) equals the marginal cost of credit, in a generalization of the
margin found in Baumol (1952). At the Friedman optimum, the nominal interest
R equals zero (equation 2.23), no credit is used (equation 2.17) and normalized
money demand (inverse money velocity) is equal to 1 (equation 2.24), which gives
the special case of a cash-only economy.
Consider what happens when ination increases. As ination rises, R rises
and the shadow cost of exchange ~R (equation 2.26) rises; the agent then substi-
tutes from money to credit as in equation (2.24) and from goods towards leisure
according to the marginal rate of substitution given in equation (2.25). This ~R is
the average exchange cost per unit of output and is equal to a weighted average of
the cost R when using cash, with the weight of m=y; and the average cost when
using credit, (1 + 2)R; as weighted by 1  m=y:8 Substitution towards leisure
x reduces the employed time (1   x); the capital to e¤ective labour ratio also
8That (1 + 2)R is an average cost can be veried by dividing the total cost of credit
production, net of deposit dividends, by the total output of credit production.
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rises across all sectors as the real wage w rises and the real interest rate r falls
(equations ??); but in equation (2.28) the rise in sHkt
lHht
is dominated by the increase
in leisure so as to reduce rH . The growth rate, in equation (2.29), therefore falls
as R rises because rH falls and because the after ination-tax return on physical
capital, which can be dened as rK  r=

1 + ~R

(see equation (2.29)), also falls.
And so the returns to capital remain the same but lower, in that rH = rK ; but
now at a lower level and the growth rate falls accordingly.
The negative ination e¤ect on the investment to capital ratio of equation
(2.30) follows directly from the growth rate e¤ect. The e¤ect of ination on the
investment to output ratio, i=y; as given in equation (2.31), similarly depends on
the growth rate e¤ect, but also on the changes in the interest rate and in the
capital share of the goods sector, sG: In the simulations below (Section 4), it is
clear that the changes in r and sG go in opposite directions and are therefore
o¤setting to some extent, leaving the growth e¤ect to dominate and to cause i=y
to fall when ination increases.
The role of the Tobin e¤ect here is actually rather secondary, as it a¤ects the
growth rate and the investment rate. The reallocation away from expensive labour
and towards cheaper capital acts to better realign factor inputs given the ination
tax. This ameliorates the negative growth and investment e¤ects, but does not
reverse them. However this positive Tobin e¤ect, in terms of the increase in the
capital to e¤ective labour ratio, uniquely determines that there is a decrease in
the real interest rate as R rises up from zero.
3.1. Credit Supply and Money Demand
As the money demand is residually determined by the credit supply, the fun-
damentals of the credit supply also underlie those of the money demand and
ultimately impact upon the sensitivity of the Tobin e¤ect. The comparative sta-
tics of the money demand with respect to the credit production parameters are
qualitatively the same as for the comparative statics for the marginal cost curve.
And a focus on marginal cost allows for simple graphical illustration, with respect
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to changes in the three structural parameters of the credit technology: AQ; 1
and 2: While an increase in ination causes more use of exchange credit, with a
movement along the marginal cost curve up to a new higher MC, a change in the
structural parameters causes the MC to shift graphically.
Proposition 2. Given q; an increase in AQ decreases the MC.
Figure 2 graphs how an increase in the credit productivity parameter AQ pivots
down the marginal cost (dotted line) from its baseline (solid line). This also causes
more credit supply and a lower money demand at a given nominal interest rate.
And it increases the balanced path growth rate (see Section 3.2 and Section 4).
The scale parameters 1 and 2 have di¤erent e¤ects on marginal cost and on
growth. These scale parameters are important for the calibration of the growth,
investment and interest rate e¤ects. First consider that their sum must be less
than one in order for the economys equilibrium to be well-dened.
Proposition 3. Assume that 1 + 2 = 1 and that both credit and goods
sectors are equally labour intensive (1 = ). Then there exists no equilibrium.
If 1 + 2 = 1; then there is no third factor, deposited funds, entering into
the credit production function and there is no equilibrium, so that the proposition
shows the importance of deposited funds as a non-trivial factor. With 1+2 < 1;
the marginal cost per unit of funds is upwards sloping as in Figure 1 (Section 2.2)
and there is a unique equilibrium of credit supplied and of money demanded, at
a given nominal interest rate.
A second important characterizing feature is that the sum of the scale para-
meters are in fact equal to a measure of the per-unit interest cost of the credit.
Here dene Rqt  Rqtdt=qt as the per unit of credit dividends.
Proposition 4. The proportional per unit cost of credit is equal to the degree
of the economies of scale, in that:
 
Rt  Rqt

=Rt = 1 + 2:
Consider that the total nancial intermediary dividends returned to the con-
sumer are Rqtdt; or Rqtdt=qt per unit of credit. The di¤erential between the
price of credit per unit of credit output, Rt; and the dividend rate of return
per unit of credit, Rqt; gives the average cost of the resource use per unit of credit,
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(1 + 2)Rt: This makes the degree of the "returns to scale", 1+2; equal to the
fraction of the nominal interest rate that are used up by the production costs per
unit of credit, which is the basis for calibration in Section 3.
Given the per unit cost interpretation of 1+2; consider how changes in these
parameters a¤ect the marginal cost of credit function:
Proposition 5. Dening curvature as  

@MCt
@qt

=

MCt
qt

; then for a given
w and r; an increase in 1 causes a decrease in the curvature of the MC curve
and an increase in the level of MC for a given level of credit output, given a
su¢ ciently low quantity of credit output.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.0
0.5
1.0
q*
MC
Figure 2. Marginal Cost with Changes in AQ and 
Figure 2 also illustrates Proposition 5. For MC = B (q)(1 )= ; where B is
given by equation (2.17), it graphs an increase in  from  = 0:25 (solid line)
to  = 0:40 (dashed line), while B actually depends on  and falls in turn in
this example from 1.73 to 0.94. The increase causes less curvature and a higher
marginal cost for a given, su¢ ciently low, q. Therefore, increasing  causes
greater "scale" which leads to lower marginal costs at high output levels but
higher marginal costs at low output levels.
The e¤ects on money demand of changes in AQ and  can be understood in
terms of shifting the marginal cost curve: If theMC shifts down, credit is cheaper,
less money is used and velocity is higher; the reverse holds if the MC shifts up.
A higher money velocity means that the ination tax falls on less real money and
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so the tax reduces the growth rate by less. Section 3.2 shows these growth e¤ects
analytically for a human capital only economy.
3.2. Growth
Analytically for the case of no physical capital, the comparative statics of the
balanced path growth rate are qualitatively the same as in the full model simu-
lations. Consider for the next two propositions that  = " = 1 and 2 = 0; then
the technology is yt = ct = AGlGtht; ht+1 = (1 + AH lHt   H)ht and qt = AQl1qt :
Proposition 6. An increase in the credit sector productivity level, AQ; causes
an unambiguous decrease in the BGP leisure use and growth rate.
This reects the intuition that greater productivity in producing credit results
in a lower marginal cost of credit production (Proposition 2), a higher money
velocity, a lower e¤ective ination tax ( ~R) in equation (2.26), less leisure use
and a higher growth rate. Increasing the scale  gives the opposite results for
su¢ ciently low nominal interest rates, since it causes marginal cost MC to rise
(Proposition 5):
Proposition 7. Given that R < R0  2
AQ
e 
3
4 ; an increase in 1 causes on the
BGP an increase in leisure use and a decrease in the growth rate.
3.3. The Real Interest Rate
Whether the capital intensities are rising across the sectors depends on whether
w=r is rising. And when sectoral capital intensities are rising, the real interest
rate is falling. A way to think intuitively of the overall forces determining r is to
think in terms of what is happening to capital intensities when ination increases.
To illustrate these e¤ects, consider the Becker (1965) concept of "full income",
yF ; that includes the shadow income from non-market output (human capital
investment) as well as the explicit income from market output, from all sectors
of the economy. Looking at his full income in terms of the total cost (TCt) of all
output, where TCt  yF ; then (sGt + sHt + sQt) rtkt+(lGt + lHt + lQt)wtht = TCt:
Note here that the banking sector cost does not include the interest cost of the
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deposits (an input to production), since this is just the residual prot that is
redistributed back to the consumer; then only the labour and capital costs remain.
Substituting into the TCt using the goods and time constraints of equations (2.4)
and (2.5), the TCt can be written as the "isocost line":
kt
ht
= At   wt
rt
(1  xt) ; (3.1)
where At  TCtrtht ; with a vertical axis of normalized capital ktht ; a horizontal axis of
raw labor 1   xt and a slope of  wtrt : The capital to e¤ective labour ratios in all
sectors have a slope that is proportional to wt
rt
; (see equation 2.27); therefore when
wt
rt
increases, the ratios sGtkt
lGtht
; sHtkt
lHtht
and sQtkt
lQtht
increase.
Figure 3 indicates the capital intensity ratios of the two sectors, goods and
human capital investment, by the slopes of the positively-sloped rays from the
origin (the goods sector is more capital intensive), and isocost lines of the form
in equation (3.1) by the negatively sloped lines. When the ination rate rises,
the labour time 1   x falls and so does k=h; so that the initial, outermost (from
the origin), isocost line shifts inward until the middle isocost line is reached, with
new higher sectoral capital intensities (dashed rays from origin). The input price
ratio w=r is higher since the slope of the isocost is steeper, capital intensities are
higher (equation 2.27) and so the real interest rate has fallen. When the ination
rate continues to rise, the k=h falls again but by less and the labour time falls
by much less, resulting in the innermost isocost line. Here w=r (the slope of the
isocost line) now has fallen back to what is was in the outermost isocost line and
the capital to e¤ective labour ratios have fallen back to the original ray from the
origin. When w=r falls, then the real interest rate rises. The falling k=h and 1 x
that underlie Figure 3, along with the i=y and r e¤ects, are shown in simulations
of the calibrated model in Section 4.
18
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
1
2
3
4
5
1-x
k/h
Figure 3. Changes in the Isocost Lines and the Sectoral Capital Intensities.
4. Calibration and Simulation
The baseline calibration sets parameters and BGP target values of variables as
based on postwar US annual data for 1954-2000; these are given in Table 4.1.
Based on the postwar US quarterly calibrations of Gomme, Ravikumar, and Ru-
pert (2006) and Gomme and Rupert (2007), the shares of e¤ective labour in the
goods sector and human capital investment sectors are 0.64 and 0.70 respectively;
the annual investment-capital ratio, i=k = (i=y) = (k=y) ; is 0:088; the implied an-
nual rate of physical capital depreciation, K = i=k  g, is 0:071; the depreciation
rate of human capital is the same as for physical capital, H = 0:071; and the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution  is 1: The average annual rate of growth
of real GDP, g; and the average ination rate, , are 1:68% and 5%, respectively,
as in the data. This implies a BGP money supply growth rate of  = 6:68%.
Given a time preference rate at the standard value of  = 4%; the nominal in-
terest rate is equal to R =  +  +  = 10:68% and the gross real return on
capital is rK = rH = g + K + + g = 12:8%: To also achieve the Gomme et al.
(2006) target values for working time lG = 0:255 and leisure x = 0:5, the utility
parameter for leisure is set at  = 1:935.
The basis for the calibration for 1+ 2 =  is the interest di¤erential formula
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PARAMETERS
Preferences
 1 Relative risk aversion parameter
 1.935 Leisure weight
 0.04 Discount rate
Goods Production
 0.64 E¤ective labour share in goods production
K 0.071 Depreciation rate of goods sector
AG 1 Goods productivity parameter
Human Capital Production
" 0.7 E¤ective labour share in human capital production
H 0.071 Depreciation rate of human capital sector
AH 0.253 Human capital productivity parameter
Banking Sector
1; 2 0.172, 0.096 Labour and capital shares in credit production
AQ 1.44 Banking productivity parameter
Government
 0.067 Money growth rate
TARGET VALUES
g 0.0168 Avg. annual output growth rate
 0.05 Avg. annual ination rate
lG 0.255 Labour used in goods sector
x 0.5 Leisure
i=k 0.088 Investment-capital ratio
m=y 0.584 Inverse money velocity
Table 4.1: Baseline Calibration
20
of Proposition 5, whereby 1 + 2 = (R   Rq)=R: It is calibrated using nancial
industry data at  = 0:268; assuming the use of data from just one year, on
the basis that this parameter does not change over time. To see how this was
calibrated, rst note that the Cobb-Douglas production function implies that
Rqd = Rq(1 ) is the total dividend returned to the consumer (interest dividend
on deposits); this makes Rq the resource cost of the credit. Per unit of credit this
is R; so  is the per unit cost of credit divided by R: To compute this, consider
that  = (Rq) = (Rq) is the total credit cost divided byRq:For the total credit cost
estimate, we use as the basis the average annual fee for a American Express credit
card as a measure of how much interest is paid on average; it is assumed to reect
the total interest costs of using the annual exchange credit through a "charge
card", rather than a roll-over intertemporal credit card. For an average person this
is calculated as $170, comprised of the basic $125 Gold Card annual fee plus ad-on
charges of $45 for late payment penalties. For R; the average 3-month Treasury
Bill interest rate, on an annual basis and as an average for the postwar data
sample period, gives that R = 0:0606: Finally for q; it is true that q = (q=d) d =
[1  (m=y)] d and that in the economy y = d; therefore q = [1  (m=y)] y: Using
real GDP per-capita at 2006 prices, y = $25127; while the US M2 average annual
income velocity for 1954-2000 is equal to 1=0:584: Putting this together, Rq =
(0:0606) (1  0:584) 25127 = 633:44; and  = 170=633:44  0:268. Dividing 
between capital and labor shares is done by assuming the same ratio of the labor
and capital shares in the goods sector: 1=2 = =(1   ) = (0:64)=(0:36): This
implies that 1 = 0:172 and 2 = 0:096:, respectively. To then achieve the target
value of m=y = 0:584; it requires that AQ = 1:44:
4.1. Credit Production
Figure 4 simulates the baseline equilibrium credit q 2 [0; 1) (equation 2.10) as
graphed with respect to the lq labour axis (curved line), including the tangency
(circle) of the prot line (straight line) of equation (2.14) to the production func-
tion; its slope equals the marginal product of credit labour, or w=R = 10:39:
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Figure 4. Baseline Equilibrium Credit Production.
4.2. Growth, Investment Rate and Tobin E¤ects
Figure 5 simulates for the baseline calibration how the growth rate falls as the
ination rate goes up (solid lines) and the comparative statics (dashed lines) of
a 5% rise in AQ and a 20% rise in . As in Propositions 6 and 7, greater credit
productivity increases the growth rate and an increase in  decreases the growth
rate for a given ination rate.
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Figure 5. Ination, Growth, and Changes in AQ and 
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Figure 7. E¤ect of Ination on Productive Time (1  x), k=h; i=y and sG:
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Figure 6 (left-hand side panels ) shows the human capital return rH (equation
2.29) and i=y (equation 2.31) falling as the ination rate increases. And it shows
(right-hand side panels) that r falls and sGk=lGh rises as ination rises, up to a
moderately high level of ination, but then the graphs reverse at higher levels
of ination. This shows that the real interest rate r falls while i=y falls, but
eventually r starts to rise, in concordance with the change in capital intensities.
Note that here r does not begin rising until at a level of the ination rate higher
than those experienced in the postwar US, thereby conrming a "positive" Tobin
e¤ect, while having a negative i=y and growth e¤ects, for the baseline calibration.
Figure 7 shows related e¤ects of ination: on the rate of productively employed
labour in all three sectors, 1 x; exhibiting a similar nonlinearity as seen for other
variables; on the physical capital to human capital ratio k=h with it also falling
in a similar nonlinear fashion; on iH=y which is the ratio of outputs in the human
capital investment and goods sectors; and on sG the share of capital in goods
production. The falling levels of both 1   x and k=h are consistent with the
isocost line of Figure 3 shifting inwards towards the origin as ination increases,
while the decrease in iH=y is consistent with the initial penalization of the labour
intensive sector, as w=r increases. These changes in iH=y are reected in the
initial rise in sG:
5. Discussion: Consistency with Facts
The paper shows potential consistency with the negative e¤ect of ination on the
balanced path growth rate of output, the investment rate and the real interest
rate. It shows that the real interest rate goes down as ination rises, for levels of
ination up to a rate that is above that found in the US postwar era. But the
other long run features of the model are also consistent with empirical experience.
The money demand interest elasticity is a generalized version of Cagan (1956)s
elasticity of  bR; where b is a positive parameter. Here the elasticity can be shown
to be a function " of bRz; where " (bRz) =  z  bRz
1 bRz with z =

1  and with b a
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function of input prices and credit technology parameters. The result is that
both elasticities rise in magnitude as the nominal interest rate rises. A Cagan
function has been supported for international data (Mark and Sul 2003) and this
particular generalized Cagan elasticity has been supported for US and Australian
data (Gillman and Otto 2007). In stochastic form, this type of money demand is
able to explain velocity at business cycle frequencies (Benk et al., 2008)
The money demand is residually determined by the credit supply, since these
are perfect substitutes in exchange. So it is noteworthy that the credit production
used here has found empirical support for its CRS specication in the nancial
intermedation/banking literature ever since this technology for nancial interme-
diation services rst emerged (Hancock 1985, Wheelock and Wilson 2006). This
means that both parts of the money-credit solutions have empirical support.
The money demand determines the velocity e¤ect and the subsequent goods to
leisure substitution. The resulting decrease in employed time (1 x) as a result of
ination (Figure 7), in the long run, is consistent with evidence nding cointegra-
tion of ination and unemployment (Ireland 1999, Shadman-Mehta 2001), given
that unemployment and the employment rate are found to move closely together.
The fact that there is the nonlinear e¤ect of ination on the employment rate may
not have been identied empirically but certainly is an area that might be further
investigated.
The credit supply behind the money demand also has the feature that nancial
development from higher credit sector productivity leads to a higher balanced
path growth rate. This result is consistent with the large literature on nance
and growth, in which nance is found to positively a¤ect growth.
And the central feature for the Tobin e¤ect of a comovement between ination
and the capital to e¤ective labour ratio is supported empirically in Gillman and
Nakov (2003), for both US and UK data. Here cointegration is found between the
two series and Granger causality is found from ination to the input ratio. This
compliments the evidence on the negative e¤ect of ination on growth, investment
and the real interest rate. So it appears that many related facets of the stationary
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equilibrium analysis are consistent with long run evidence.
However in qualication the models simulated decrease in the real interest rate
(Figure 6) is small in magnitude, compared for example to Rapach (2003) who
nds larger decreases in the real interest rate from ination increases. However
there are no taxes in our model as in Feldstein (1982) and there may be other
features not modeled that make the simulated e¤ect relatively small. The model
captures many features simultaneously, in terms of the signs of the changes of
many variables, the prole of the changes across the range of ination (for the
ination-growth e¤ect) and the functional forms (for money demand and credit
supply) that are also found in the empirical results. The restriction of calibrating
the model carefully to US postwar data makes it challenging to get magnitudes of
all such changes to correspond to empirical ndings, especially given di¤erently
estimated models without precisely comparable results.
However the model does capture for example the estimated magnitudes for the
decrease in the output growth rate, which has been well-investigated in empirical
studies. For example, Barro (1995) using international panel data nds a 0.24
percentage point decrease in the growth rate from a 10 point increase in the
ination rate. Our Figure 5 shows that the growth rate falls by 0.4 percentage
points, when ination rises from 10% to 20%, and this falls to a 0.2 decrease
when ination rises from 20 to 30%; others show that this magnitude does indeed
decrease as the ination rate goes up (Gillman, Harris, and Matyas 2004).
Thus the paper has mostly restricted its theoretical description of the empirical
ndings to one of getting the direction of the changes correct, within a well-
calibrated model, for ranges of the ination rate as seen in the postwar US data.
The prole of the ination-growth e¤ect and the money demand functional form
are exceptions, in that these are rather well-studied over di¤erent ination rates,
and we can capture these accurately within the model. The non-linearity in the
ination-growth e¤ect has not been well studied in other dimensions. Our results
in particular nd this same prole for the investment-output ratio; further study
of whether this prole exists empirically would be interesting.
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6. Conclusion
The paper o¤ers a solution to the puzzle of explaining conicting Tobin type ev-
idence that is found in the literature. It focuses on a natural way to dene the
Tobin e¤ect in terms of the e¤ect of ination on capital intensity as in Tobin. But
the models capital intensity is the capital to e¤ective labor ratio, with e¤ective
labor indexed by Lucas (1988) human capital instead of by Solow (1956) techno-
logical change, as in Tobin. For ination rates within the US postwar experience,
the results within the calibrated economy are that ination causes a rise in the
ratio of the wage rate to the real interest, a rise in the capital to e¤ective labour
ratio across sectors and a decrease in the real interest rate. This is consistent
with Tobins decrease in the real interest rate even though it includes a Stockman
(1981) exchange constraint that causes an ination tax on investment.
The ability to explain this evidence qualitatively, in a quantitatively precise
calibration, along with related ination e¤ects indicates some success with this
approach. This suggests that it may be arbitrary to restrict the specication
of cash-in-advance exchange constraints to cover only consumption goods, while
leaving investment to be frictionlessly acquired. One way to test the appropriate-
ness of the models exchange constraint specication is to investigation stochastic
extensions of this model, with shocks for example as in Benk et al. (2008). It
might be possible to determine if the papers Stockman (1981) approach, within
endogenous growth and with money and banking, leads to a stronger explanation
of the movements of real and nominal variables over time.
A. Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1 Proof : Given  2 (0; 1) and MCt = Bt (qt )(
1 
 ), it is clear
that Bt > 0; which implies that the "slope" coe¢ cient Bt is positive. For
Bt held constant at B; @MCt@qt =
1 

B (qt )
1 

 1 > 0 if  < 1; establishing
the MC upward slope. Then the exact value of  determines the curvature:
@2MCt
@(qt )
2 =

1 

  1

1 


Bt (q

t )
1 

 2 > 0; if  < 0:5 and @
2MCt
@(qt )
2 > 0 if  > 0:5;
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establishing convexity and concavity respectively.
Proposition 2 Proof : From equation (2.17), for a given q and (1 + 2) 2
(0; 1); it follows that @ (MC) =@AQ < 0:
Proposition 3 Proof: From equation (2.10), qt=dt = AQ

lQht
dt
1  sQkt
dt
2
and with 1+ 2 = 1; then 1 = AQ (lQht=qt)
1 (sQkt=qt)
2 : Using equations (2.10)
and (2.24), it can be shown that lQht=qt = 1R=w and sQkt=qt = 2R=r; sub-
stituting these relations back into the previous equation, it results that 1 =
AQ (1R=w)
1 (2R=r)
2 ; or R = A 1Q (1=w)
 1 (2=r)
 2 : Substituting in for w
and r from the equations (2.19) and (2.20), R =


1
1 1 
2
2 AG
AQ

lGht
sGkt
( 1)
:
With 1 = ; the last expression becomes R =
AG
AQ
: The nominal interest rate is
a constant independent of the growth rate: R =  + +  (given the log-utility
assumption) which in general is not equal to AG
AQ
; giving a contradiction. In the
case when AG
AQ
= ++; then there is no equilibrium since AG > 0 implies that
R > 0; then equation (2.24) implies that qt =1, which violates that qt=dt 2 [0; 1);
derived by combining equations (2.2) and (2.3).
Proposition 4 Proof: Since Rt = pqt by equation (2.22), then, by use of
the CRS property of the production function of equation (2.9), wtlQtht
Rtqt
= 1
and rtsQtkt
Rtqt
= 2. From equation (2.14) and using the denitions above of lqt
 lQtht
dt
; sqt  sQtktdt and qt 
qt
dt
; then it follows that Rqt = Rtqt   1Rtqt  
2Rtq

t = Rtq

t (1  1   2) : With the denition above that Rq  Rqt=qt ; then
Rq = Rt (1  1   2) ; or Rt = Rq+(1 + 2)Rt and so
 
Rt  Rqt

=Rt = 1+2:
Proposition 5 Proof: With   1 + 2 and  

@MC
@q

=

MC
q

; then
 = (1  ) = and @=@1 < 0: Second, by equation (2.17), @MC@1 =
@
@1

e
1

h
1 log
w
1
+2 log
r
2
 logAQ+(1 ) log q
i
and this writes as @MC
@1
=
MC 

 +2 log wr  2 log
1
2
 log AQ
q
2

: For ease of exposition, let 1 = 2: Then
@MC
@1
=
MC
 21+1 log wr  log
AQ
q
4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> 0; for q < e 21
 
w
r
1 A 1Q :
Propositions 6 and 7 both use the following BGP equilibrium solution
for the case with no physical capital: q = (1R=AG)
1=(1 1)A1=(1 1)Q ;
ct
ht
=
28
AG[1+AH(1 x) H ]
AH(1+1AGq
R)(1+) ; x =

1+

(R)

1+
1 H
AH

1+ 
1+

(R)
; where 
 (R) = 1+(1 q
)R+(1)qR
1+1AGq
R (ratio
of "shadow price" of goods to "social cost" of goods) and 1 + g = 1+AH(1 x) H
1+
:
Proposition 6 Proof: From the solution given above, it is clear that @q=@AQ >
0 and since 1 < 1 that @
 (R) =@q
 < 0:With H < 1; it follows that @x=@
 (R) >
0: Consequently @x=@AQ < 0; with @g=@x < 0; then @g=@AQ > 0:
Proposition 7 Proof: From the solution given above, 1 + g = 1+AH(1 x) H
1+
and so @g
@1
=   AH
1+
@x
@1
: Using sign(x) for the sign of x; it follows that sign

@g
@1

is a negative function of sign

@x
@1

= sign

@

@1

: Given that AG = 1 as in the
baseline calibration, from the solution above 
 = 1 + (1 q
)R
1+1q
R and
d

d1
= @

@q
@q
@1
+
@

@1
=   R(1+1R)
(1+1q
R)2
@q
@1
  (1 q)R
(1+1q
R)2 q
R where @q

@1
= @
@1
n
e
1
1 1 log[AQ(1R)
1 ]
o
=
q
1 1+log(1AQR)
(1 1)2
: Thus d

d1
=   qR(1+1R)
(1+1q
R)2

1 1+log(1AQR)
(1 1)2
+ (1 q
)R
(1+1R)

and since
(1  q)R < 1+1R for R 6 1;
1 1+log(1AQR)
(1 1)2
+ (1 q
)R
(1+1R)
<
1 1+log(1AQR)
(1 1)2
+1 < 0
if R < R0  1
1AQ
e (1 1)(2 1): In the baseline calibration, AQ = 1:44; 1 = 0:268
and so R0 = 0:73; establishing that @g
@1
< 0 for R < 0:73:
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